Perspective on China’s Rise

posted by Marsha Vande Berg on October 5, 2015 - 1:49pm

The economic imperatives of global powers are changing approaches to international politics.

China’s rise could reshape an icon of international relations, post-World War II -- the Transatlantic Relationship between the United States and Germany – and Europe. An economic symbiosis that addresses China’s need for technology and Germany’s search for export markets could drive a shift in shared foreign policy interests on the part of Washington and Berlin.

Europe likewise is seeking a stronger strategic economic partnership with China, which Germany is encouraging as an extension of the intra-European Union Lisbon Treaty and its Lisbon foreign policy institutions.  Recent illustration of Europe’s eagerness is European capitals’ fulsome embrace in the face of US recalcitrance, of a Chinese initiative to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral institution intended to address Asia’s immense infrastructure needs.  The AIIB’s 57 members include Germany, France and the United Kingdom but not the United States, Canada and Japan.

Hans Kundnani, editorial director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Germany has been pushing hard for a comprehensive European China policy that includes more systematic cooperation between member states and the European Union’s institutions. Berlin also has showed signs of impatience with what it sees as Brussels’ labored pace in the face of snarly institutional issues, not the least of which is uncertainty about the outcome of Greek reforms.

In remarks in late September to San Francisco members of the American Council on Germany, Kundnani made the point that Germany’s bilateral interests are influencing Europe and by extension, the venerable Transatlantic Relationship. Germany’s interest in a stronger bilateral with China could result in a “big source of transatlantic tension” if Washington takes an increasingly tougher stand toward China, argued Kundnani.

The author of The Paradox of German Power said he was referring specifically to the possibility of sanctions against Chinese companies which Washington believes benefitted from cyber theft of intellectual property rights. Washington also was justly outraged at the massive cyber espionage of the US Office of Personnel Management and the hacking of information about 21 million current and former US officials.

If Kundnani’s argument is on point, then the recent US/China agreement to jointly address cyber security issues may at least temporarily alleviate the author’s concerns about repercussions for the Transatlantic Relationship. The agreement by presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama during Xi’s state visit in Washington DC, seems to have reduced the call for sanctions. Still concerns grow, not the least of which is the overall quality of the US/China relationship.

Cyber threats were just one in an array of issues facing the Xi-Obama visit in late September – prompting Robert Manning, senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security, Atlantic Council, to write in YaleGlobal Online that the relationship may very well be at a “tipping point”. It is increasingly difficult “to sustain a relationship that is more cooperative than it is competitive --   and not allow one area of disagreement or confrontation overwhelm the overall relationship.”

Competition versus cooperation is increasingly how this critical G-2 relationship gets described. It hints at a zero sum game where the economic piece – totaling $590 billion in two-way trade in 2014 – gets wrapped in with security and political imperatives reflecting the two powers’ differing cultural roots as well as their outlook on respective global roles.

It’s clear that many in Washington heartily applaud China’s economic advance since the days of its early economic reforms. By the same token, Washington is wary about what it sees as a rising nationalism that is biased toward supporting national champions and thwarting foreign enterprise China’s soil. On the other hand, Beijing is similarly critical of Washington for what China sees as America overplaying their national interests to thwart Chinese investment plans subject to review by an opaque CIFIUS process (Committee on Foreign Investment in the US).

Many in China also question the benefits to the world economic order of institutions that are defined and supported by US-formulated structures. They also question the legitimacy of America’s rationale for US-led military alliances in Asia.

Madame Fu Ying, chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress recently delivered the 22nd Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) Fullerton Lecture recently in Singapore. China seeks a conversation with the United States as a partner and not as a rival – and it’s up to the two countries to bridge the fundamental divides.

 “The way I see it, is the United States remains the strongest of all powers in today’s world. Whether the world order is able to adjust and change so that we (China and the US) can work together instead of against one another as rivals on the world stage is a test for the United States,” said Madame Fu. But then, it’s also a test for China’s statecraft.

Former US Ambassador to the Philippines and Japan, Michael Armacost, now Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, Stanford University, described recent US/Sino agreements on cyber security and climate change as giant steps toward a cooperative relationship. He noted that China also invested more in the United States in 2014 than it did at home.

Concerns persist, however. China’s rapid emergence as a naval power in Asia represents a new set of circumstances for the United States, which has pretty much had the region to itself since post World War II.  Still it’s particularly “jarring” when China describes as indisputable its claims to land and waters in the South China Seas.

China’s intention to raise major funding for infrastructure in Asia is also admirable as well as ambitious, Armacost said, speaking to an international audience convened by the Council for the US and Italy in early October in San Francisco. It’s also noteworthy that such efforts are a boon to China’s interests in integrating itself more deeply in the region.

At the end of the day, established powers will insist that rising powers understand that what they do affects how the world works, and vice versa.  Do actions reflect rules-based governance that the world can count on – or is the larger intent directed at competition versus cooperation?

One question leads to another. Answers are elusive, whether they concern the US/China relationship or the transatlantic relationship.

Westbindung is how Germans described the early stages of the post World War II Transatlantic Relationship. Trust was the underpinning – trust in America, the US foreign and economic policies, the legal system and in Americans, and in Germans’ own commitment to becoming productive, responsible regional and global stakeholders. But now, according to Kundnani, this trust is at risk, augmented by Germany’s push to accommodate its growing export machine.

The author of The Paradox of German Power describes a “burgeoning economic interdependence” between China and Germany today.  Germany is now China’s number one trading partner in Europe. And China is Germany’s most important economic partner in Asia.

What will be the imperatives that flow from such a deepening strategic relationship?  Again, answers are elusive, but a requisite dynamic that is critical to keeping great power relationships moving forward doesn’t have to be elusive.

Cooperation and competition will always pose a dichotomy. The key will always be finding that middle ground of mutual interest and preventing difficult disagreements devolving into irreversible conflict.